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NO COMPRENDO: THE NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING DEFENDANT AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS
JOAN BAINBRIDGE SAFFORD*
The non-English-speaking defendant in a
criminal proceeding poses increasing problems
for the administration of criminal justice. Mi-
norities for whom English is not the principal
language or who speak such unusual dialects of
English as to cloud understanding and commu-
nication make up a discouraging proportion of
offenders.' In areas of large ethnic enclaves
where English is not the dominant tongue, offi-
cials have estimated that between thirty and
forty per cent of criminal defendants require
the aid of an interpreter fully to understand the
proceedings against them.
2
Thirty-five states make some statutory provi-
sion for appointment of interpreters in speci-
fied cases .3 The Illinois statute is typical of one
* J. D., Northwestern University School of Law,
Office of Illinois Attorney General, Criminal Justice
Division.
I NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS AND GOALS, COMMUNITY
CRIME PREVENTION 151 (1973).
2 Testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights 118, in Los Angeles (Aug. 17, 1968).
3 States not providing for language interpreters
are: Alabama, Colorado, Maine, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Ver-
mont, Washington and West Virginia. Louisian.
makes provision for interpreters only in trials of stat
military personnel. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:12
(West 1975). Pennsylvania makes provision for ap
pointment of interpreters to aid the court in th.
Court of Common Pleas only. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17
§ 1875 (Purdon 162).
A number of states make generous provisions for
deaf persons in criminal cases, but do not make any
of the same provisions for those with language diffi-
culty. E.g., W. VA. CODE §57-5-7 (1974 Supp.);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 17-137 k (West 1975): "(a)
In any criminal or civil action involving a deaf person,
the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to assist
such person throughout such proceeding." The only
other relevant Connecticut statute relates to compen-
sation of interpreters. Nebraska expressly recognizes
that appointment of an interpreter for the deaf is
necessary to protect the constitutional right of the
defendant to participate in the preparation and trial
of his case, yet the constitutional rights of the non-
English speaking defendant are not considered. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-2401 to § 25-2406 (1975). Compare
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-242 A-D (1974), providing for
group:
Whenever any person accused of committing a
felony or misdemeanor is to be tried in any court
of this State, the court shall upon its own motion
or that of the defense or prosecution determine
whether the accused is capable of expressing
himself in the English language so as to be un-
derstood directly by counsel, court or jury. If
the court finds the accused incapable of so un-
derstanding or so expressing himself, the court
shall appoint an interpreter for the accused
whom he can understand and who can under-
stand him.
4
compulsory appointment of qualified interpreters for
the deaf, with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-241 and § 11-601
(5), providing for discretionary appointment of lan-
guage interpreters with no reference to standards.
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 165-11 (1975). The
Illinois statute is similar to section 752, chapter 4 of
the California Evidence Code which provides for in-
terpreters for witnesses. See CAL. EvID. CODE §
752(a) (West 1966). More common and the form Illi-
nois used until 1973 are statutes patterned after rule
28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
The court may appoint an interpreter of its own
selection and may fix the reasonable compensa-
tion of such interpreter. Such compensation shall
be paid out of funds provided by law or by the
goverment, as the court may direct.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 28. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-
241 (1956); DEL. CT. C.P.R. 28; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 606.9 (1969); IND. R. TR 43 (F); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-17-7 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2301.12
(Supp. 1974).
Most protective of the non-English-speaking de-
fendant are statutes similar to Michigan's:
If any person is accused of any crime or misde-
meanor and is about to be examined or tried
before any justice of the peace, magistrate or
judge or a court of record and it appears to the
magistrate or judge that such person is incapable
of adequately understanding the charge or pre-
senting his defense thereto because of a lack of
ability to understand or speak the English lan-
guage or inability adequately to communicate by
reason of being deaf and/or mute, or that such
person suffers from a speech defect or other
physical defect which handicaps such person in
maintaining his rights in such cause, the justice
of the peace, magistrate or judge shall appoint a
qualified person to act as an interpreter. ...
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1256 (1) (1971).
See also ARE. STAT. ANN. § 5-715 (1976); IOWA
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Standards for interpretation are almost non-
existent. Illinois requires the interpreter to
swear "to truly interpret or translate all ques-
tions propounded or answers given as directed
by the court."' But if the interpreter is translat-
ing off-the-record for the benefit of the de-
fendant, there is no check on the accuracy of
the translation.
Almost nowhere is statutory provision made
for interpreters at early stages after arrest.6 In
almost every jurisdiction, once criminal charges
are lodged the judge is given broad latitude to
decide whether to appoint an interpreter, while
no regular procedures are prescribed for deter-
mining need.7 Reviewing courts rarely question
the trial judge's decision if there is any evidence
at all of the defendant's ability to understand or
speak some English, or if any translation has
been provided. When an appeal is made on the
basis of a constitutional claim that the defend-
ant did not understand the proceedings or that
they were inadequately translated to him, there
is no record of what the defendant heard and
understood to settle the very question raised for
review.
This article examines the problems inherent
in arresting, setting bail for, arraigning, accept-
ing a plea from and trying a defendant whose
ability to understand and express himself in
CODE Ann. § 622 A.1-1-6 (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4351 to § 75-4355 (Supp. 1975); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 623 (a) (1968).
The New Mexico Constitution provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right . . . to have the charge and testimony inter-
preted to him in a language he understands." N. M.
CONST. art. 2, § 14.
Certain West Texas border counties make provi-
sion for conducting the proceedings in Spanish with
English interpreters. TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 3737 d-1
(Supp. 1976).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 165-12 (1976).
6 Kansas is unique in prohibiting interrogation
without an interpreter if the defendant's "primary
language is one other than English .... KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4351 to § 75-4355 (Supp. 1975).
7 MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-17-7 (1972) is typical:
Interpreters.
In criminal cases, the court may appoint an inter-
preter when necessary, sworn truly to interpret,
and allow him a reasonable compensation, not
exceeding five dollars per day, payable out of the
county treasury.
For a discussion of problems of trying a non-Eng-
lish-speaking defendant see Comment, Right to an
Interpreter, 25 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 145 (1970);
Comment, Constitutional Law: Translators: Mandatory
for Due Process, 2 CONN. L. REV. 163 (1969).
English is minimal or non-existent. A critical
examination of the Illinois statutes on inter-
preters and Illinois decisions on the constitu-
tional questions raised by failure to provide an
interpreter suggests that Illinois is far behind
the federal courts and the courts of some other
states in protecting the interests of linguistically
handicapped criminal defendants. Yet in those
courts in Cook County where a professional
interpreter is regularly available, there is devel-
oping a judicial practice of calling upon the
interpreter when there is any indication of
need, even at an early stage in the proceedings.
This is far more than is required by Illinois
decisions and even beyond that practice sug-
gested by various circuits of the United States
Court of Appeals. Although concentrating par-
ticularly on the problems of the Spanish-speak-
ing defendant, a member of the largest linguis-
tic minority in Cook County, this article makes
criticisms and recommendations that apply
equally as well to the handling of the case of any
non-English-speaking defendant.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The 1970 decennial census revealed that
more than thirty-three million residents of the
United States reported that their "mother
tongue" was a language other than English."
More than twenty-two million residents were
either first generation or second generation im-
migrants of foreign-speaking parentage.9
Puerto Ricans, who are considered "native," are
not included in this figure. As the 1970 census is
known to have ignored large numbers of urban
poor, 0 and as the foreign-speaking are largely
concentrated in the metropolitan areas of the
country, the number for whom English is not
the primary language could be much higher.
Some scholars have estimated the number as
high as twenty-six million."
8 "Mother tongue" means language spoken during
childhood. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF
POPULATION, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, MOTHER
TONGUE, AND CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 1
(Supp. 1974) [Publications from the 1970 census are
hereinafter cited as 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION to-
gether with the title of the special publication].
9 Id. at 3, Table 193.
i" N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
Estimates of the number of urban poor not counted
in the 1970 census range as high as nine million
persons.
" 2 T. ANDERSON & M. BOYER, g BILINGUAL
SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (1970).
[Vol. 68
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Although significant portions of this popula-
tion probably have little or no language diffi-
culty with English, those who have grown up in
large and expanding ethnic neighborhoods,
those who have migrated back and forth to the
United States from Mexico or Puerto Rico, or
those whose work groups them with others of
the same language, have not had the same push
to linguistic assimilation which other genera-
tions have experienced.
2
More than nine million people identified by
the 1970 census considered Spanish their first
language or came from a household in,which
the father or mother was reported to have
Spanish as a mother tongue.'2 This figure is
undoubtedly low. In 1974, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service estimated that there
were between four and five million illegal aliens
in the United States. In December, 1975, the
estimate was eight million, the vast bulk of them
Spanish-speaking'
4
Sheer numbers have led to an infrastructure
within the Spanish-speaking community which
protects but also isolates the Spanish speaker
from the English-speaking community." In
San Antonio, sixty-two per cent of those low-
income Mexican-Americans living in census
tracts with more than 400 Spanish-speaking
people could speak little or no English. A simi-
lar survey in census tracts in Los Angeles with
high concentrations of low-income Mexican-
Americans revealed that fifty-one per cent of
the residents could not speak any English. 6
Another study of Puerto Ricans in New York
found more than seventeen per cent of the
children and presumably almost twice that
number of adults spoke little or no English. 7 A
12 L. GREBLER, J. MOORE AND R. GUZMAN, THE
MEXICAN-AMERICAN PEOPLE at 87-94, 424-427 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as GREBLER]. See generally, LAN-
GUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (J. Fishman
ed. 1966).
13 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, PERSONS OF SPAN-
ISH ANCESTRY, PERSONS OF SPANISH LANGUAGE BY
REGIONS, DIVISIONS AND STATES 9, Table 3 (Supp.
1973).
" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (Apr. 3
and June 25, 1974); Leonard F. Chapman, Comm'r,
Immigration & Naturalization Service, quoted in N.Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 1975, § 1, at 27, col. 1.
15 Comment, "Citado a Comparacer": Language Bar-
riers and Due Process-Is Mailed Notice in English Consti-
tutionally Sufficient?, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1394, 1400
(1973).
16 GREBLER, supra note 12, at 424, Table 18-I.
17 U.S. PUERTO Rico COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF
study of Spanish-speaking people in the south-
west revealed that they averaged little more
than eight years of education. When students
left school, nearly three-fourths of them were
below grade level. 18 Inadequately equipped by
education and disabled by language from tak-
ing jobs outside of the Spanish-speaking com-
munity, they lost much of the English which
they had learned, and became further iso-
lated. 9
The large number of Spanish-speaking resi-
dents in Chicago and their high concentration
in certain areas of that city suggest the same
experience of linguistic isolation. The 1970 cen-
sus counted 247,343 Spanish-speaking residents
in the city of Chicago; 2 some estimate that
there may be at least another 100,000.21 Fifty-
three census tracts in the city were reported to
have 400 or more Spanish-speaking residents .
22
Income and education levels among this group
are low.2 3 But even rising income, the usual
route out of ethnic isolation, has affected Span-
ish-speaking residents less than earlier groups.
Among white Spanish-speaking residents in
Chicago above the poverty line, more than
PUERTO Rico, STATUS DE PUERTO Rico 152 (1966)
[herinafter cited as STATUS OF PUERTO Rico]. Only 58
per cent of Puerto Rican children in the New York
schools were rated fluent in English.
'8 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE UNFINISHED
EDUCATION (1971). Among those who remain in
school, 63 per cent are below grade level and 40 per
cent have severe reading retardation (two or more
years below grade level). Id. at 25-26.
19 GREBLER, supra note 12, at chs. 5, 7, 18.
20 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, SOCIAL CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE POPULATION. CHICAGO, ILL. 119,
Table P-2. Almost one million residents of Chicago
were of foreign or mixed parentage, or foreign-born.
Id. The 1960 CENSUS did not count Spanish-language
residents, 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CENSUS
TRACTS, CHICAGO, ILL. 19, Table P-I, but the
Puerto-Rican population in Chicago had increased
from 32,371 to 78,826 in 1970, the Mexican from
44,600 to 107,925. 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, PER-
SONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN 165, Table 14.
2' Telephone interview, U.S. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service, Inspectors Division, (Nov. 4, 1975).
22 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, ECONOMIC CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF PERSONS OF SPANISH LANGUAGE 559-
568, Table P-8.
' Median income for a Spanish-language family of
median size, 4.63 persons, was $8,983; median years
of school, 9.2. The figures are markedly lower for
Puerto Rican heads of households of whom only
15.9% completed high school. 1970 CENSUS OF POPU-
LATION, PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN, FAMILY IN-




twenty-seven per cent continue to live in Span-
ish-speaking, low-income areas.
2 4
The inability to cope in any but the most
cursory way with the demands of the dominant
culture affects the non-English-speaking resi-
dent in a host of areas, 2 but it is in confronta-
tions with the law that the risks of incompre-
hension are highest. A study of the genesis of
New York policemen's abuses of power re-
vealed that many officers interpreted the Span-
ish-speaking resident's failure to answer their
questions as a form of defiance. 26 One police-
man told New York Civil Liberties Union law-
yers that when a young Puerto Rican had an-
swered an officer's questions in Spanish
prompting laughter among his companions,
the officer had slapped the boy to "maintain his
authority." 7
This same phenomenon was reported by the
California State Advisory Committee to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights.28 In
a series of cases where Spanish-speaking per-
sons failed to comprehend what was said, the
policemen were enraged by the lack of response
to orders. 29 In Chicago, a Mexican-American,
arriving at school late in the afternoon to see
about his brother's truancy, asked directions to
the principal's office and was ordered out of the
school by an off-duty policeman serving as a
school guard. He apparently misunderstood
24 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Low INCOME
NEIGHBORHOODS IN LARGE CITIES, CHICAGO ii
(Supp. 1974). Only 16 per cent of non-Spanish-lan-
guage whites who were below the poverty level lived
in such neighborhoods. Id. In the low income neigh-
borhood with the highest proportion of Spanish-lan-
guage residents, Neighborhood 3 (41%), more than
60 per cent of the Spanish-language whites were
above the poverty level. Id. at 1, Table A-1. More
Mexicans live in Chicago than anywhere outside the
Southwest. Only New York City has more Puerto
Ricans. ILL. STATE ADVISORY CoMiMn. TO THE U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BILINGUAL/BICULTURAL
EDUCATION 4 (1974).
25 Liebowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Dis-
crimnination, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 7, 51-67 (1969)
(catalogues state statutes and regulations requiring
knowledge of English).
26 P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 69 (1969).
271 Id. at 70. A similar incident happened when
Haitian youths spoke Creole when approached by
police.
" U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, MEXICAN AMERI-
CANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE
SOUTHWEST 66 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MEXICAN
AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE].
21 1d. at 67.
and pushed past toward the principal's office,
leading to a fight and an assault charge."0
The Civil Rights Commission concluded after
a series of hearings that the source of the trou-
ble is often that the English-speaking policeman
cannot comprehend the Spanish-speaker's in-
tent from his speech.3 ' The regular rise and fall
of the Spanish intonation pattern, when accen-
tuated by excitement, may be interpreted as a
harangue. Thus, during a riot in East Los An-
geles when police overheard a young Mexican
attempting to quiet the crowd, they assumed
that he was agitating it and arrested him.32 Fi-
nally, misinterpretation of words similar to
those ;n English can lead to miscomprehension
and tragic consequences. When a mother com-
plained to the police that her husband had
drunkenly struck their daughter, the police
took this to mean that the father was sexually
molesting the child and arrested him. Under-
standing almost no English, the father did not
object to the charge. The father remained in
jail two months unable to make bail.3 3 In Chi-
cago, with a Spanish-speaking population of at
least 9.4 per cent and a police force with fewer
than 200 Spanish-speaking officers, 34 the po-
tential for these misunderstandings is enor-
mous.
More often, of course, arrest results not from
misunderstanding but from probable cause.
Once an arrest has been made, an interpreter
may be necessary to warn the defendant of the
right to counsel and the right to remain silent,
and for effective questioning if those rights are
waived. If the defendant speaks some English,
it is almost impossible to show later that the
warning was not understood or the waiver un-
knowing. Only Kansas requires appointment of
30 Case of Carlos R., Nw. U. Legal Assistance Clinic
(April 14, 1974).
31 MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 68.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 70.
11 Telephone interview with Richard Phelan, Ass't
Corp. Counsel, City of Chicago (Dec. 5, 1975). As of
1974, only one per cent of Chicago's police force was
"Hispanic." During 1971-73, only twenty-three His-
panic officers were added to the police force. United
States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 548-49
(N.D. Il1. 1974). At the City of Chicago Police Depart-
ment, 14th District, located in a Latino neighbor-
hood, there were only two Spanish-language officers
as of June, 1974. Interview with Police Officer Durr,
(July 9, 1974).
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an interpreter at this time. 35 Arizona requires
that upon the arrest of a deaf-mute, no interro-
gation of any kind shall take place prior to
appointment of an interpreter and that there
be a formal determination of the interpreter's
competence. 36 But Arizona does not require
comparable protection for the non-English-
speaking defendant. No case in Illinois has held
that the Illinois statute requires appointment of
a language interpreter at the time bail is set for
the defendant, although it could be argued that
the determination of whether bail is excessive,
in violation of the eighth amendment, cannot
be made if the court is unable to communicate
with the defendant.
3 7
In People v. Macias,3 s the defendant, who
spoke no English, and her companions, were
charged with aggravated assault and carrying a
concealed weapon. Taken before the magis-
trate at 2:00 A.M., the defendant was unable to
explain that she had no arrest record, had been
regularly employed for four years, had lived at
the same address for three years, and was the
mother of a three-year-old child whom she had
left with a babysitter when she went to work
that evening. All these were factors which the
Bail Reform Act of 1966'9 suggested would be
proper ones to weigh when considering
whether to grant bail and which might have
affected the judgment of the court that night as
to the bond required. But until May, 1975, no
interpreter was available in any Illinois court at
this stage of the proceedings. 40
KAN. Stat. ANN. § 75-4351 (Supp. 1975):
A qualified interpreter shall be appointed in
the following cases for persons whose primary
language is one other than English, or who are
deaf or mute or both:
(e) .... When such person is arrested for an
alleged violation of a criminal law of the state or
any city ordinance. Such appointment shall be
made prior to any attempt to interrogate or take
a statement from such persons.
36 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 12-242 B (Supp. 1976).
37 In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Supreme
Court held that bail set at an amount more than is
reasonably necessary to assure the defendant's ap-
pearance at trial is excessive.
as No. 74-01764 (Cook County Criminal Court,
1974). Macias remained in the Cook County House of
Correction, Division 3, for more than three weeks
without being provided an interpreter. Information
obtained from the Nw. U. Legal Assistance Clinic
(June, 1974).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1970).
40 In May, 1975, at the urging of the Cook County
It also appears that no right to an interpreter
at the preliminary hearing is recognized by the
Illinois foreign language interpreters statute.
4
1
This statute provides for appointment of an
interpreter when a person accused of commit-
ting a felony or misdemeanor "is to be tried in
any court of this State.""2 Arguably the prere-
quisite for implementation of the interpreters
statute is not established until after the prelimi-
nary hearing. Therefore, the earliest stage in
the criminal process when Illinois law recog-
nizes that there may be a need for an inter-
preter for non-English-speaking defendants is
at arraignment. On the other hand, Illinois law
does require that both at the bond and prelimi-
nary hearings a qualified interpreter must be
appointed by the court to interpret the pro-
ceedings to a deaf person. 43 No challenge has
been made to the statute on equal protection
grounds as applied to this stage of the criminal
process, but it is hard to justify a distinction
between the deaf person and the linguistically
crippled.
Furthermore, the thrust of the two statutes is
markedly different, as is their potential for pro-
tecting the defendant's constitutional rights.
The statute providing for an interpreter for the
deaf makes appointment obligatory, makes
clear that the proceedings are to be interpreted
to the defendant, and requires a "qualified in-
terpreter of the deaf sign language."a4 The stat-
ute for language interpreters in criminal trials
provides that the court shall determine upon its
own motion or that of counsel whether the
accused cannot understand the English lan-
guage or make himself understood by court,
counsel or jury.4 5 The focus is on the court's
ability to take testimony, not the accused's abil-
ity to understand the proceedings. The statute
Circuit Court Judge Wayne W. Olson, and through
the action of Judge Eugene Wachowski, a full-time
interpreter of Spanish was appointed to the Cook
County Criminal Court Building in Chicago at an
annual salary of $11,800 and an interpreter of
French, Spanish and Italian was appointed to cover
the Cook County Branch courts. These two inter-
preters were originally responsible for all other
branches of the Cook County Crimihal Court. Inter-
view with Judge Wayne Olson, Cook County Crimi-
nal Court, Branch 44 (Dec. 2, 1975).
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 165-11 (1975).
42 Id.
41 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.01 (1975).
44 Id.
45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 165-11 (1970).
1977]
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contains no requirements of competence be-
yond those implied by the interpreter's oath,
46
which does not apply to testimony not offered
to the court. Furthermore, there is no explicit
requirement that the proceedings be inter-
preted to the defendant.
Because the procedures for determining
need and for determining an interpreter's com-
petence are not spelled out in the foreign lan-
guage interpreters statute, the trial court has
much greater latitude for the exercise of discre-
tion than does the court in applying the inter-
preters-for-the-deaf statute. As a result, a re-
viewing court is less likely to find an abuse of
discretion.
This deference to the trial court's implied
conclusion that the defendant can "speak and
understand English" is not unreasonable. Un-
derstandably, the reviewing court is hesitant to
find error in a meagre record if there is some
evidence to support the trial court. The written
record is inadequate on the very question
raised. Often the reviewing court has only a few
isolated words by which to judge, particularly if
the defendant has pleaded guilty or has not
testified in his own defense. The principle of
deference was articulated by the appellate court
in People v. Tripp:47
When the witnesses labor under the handicap of
language difficulties, an appellate court, which
sees only the written record, should pay more
than ordinary deference to the conclusions
drawn by the trial judge, who observed de-
meanor and gestures of the witnesses and heard
possibly important variables of inflection and
emphasis .48
That the court is able to make some sense of
what the person said is not determinative of
whether the defendant "speaks English" suffi-
ciently well to manage without an interpreter.
The question is whether the person under-
stands the question addressed to him and can
give an answer which conveys what he means to
the court."6 Whether the defendant's English is
46 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 165-12 (1970).
4, 19 Ill. App. 3d 200, 311 N.E.2d 168 (1974).
18 Id. at 203, 311 N.E.2d at 170.
" This distinction is illustrated by People v. Ortiz,
22 Ill. App.3d 788, 317 N.E. 2d 763 (1974), in which
the defendant claimed the witnesses needed the ser-
vices of an interpreter. The victim of the assault had
had little opportunity to observe and had made an
error in identification. Four alibi witnesses. two of
sufficient will depend also on the complexity of
the issues for trial.
Undoubtedly, determination of the suffi-
ciency of the defendant's English should be
made by the trial court, but it should be done
expressly. The First Circuit in United States v.
Carrion0 endorsed the vesting of broad discre-
tion in the trial court, stressing, however, the
consequent obligations on the trial court: (1) to
inform the defendant of the right to an inter-
preter, (2) to appoint an interpreter if the de-
fendant is indigent, and (3) to be alert for such
language difficulty during the trial as would
require a new determination of need. The First
Circuit appeared to require a formal hearing
on the question of need or, at least, clear evi-
dence on the record demonstrating the trial
court's continuing attention to the defendant's
possible need.5'
The Illinois courts have not met this stan-
dard. If the reviewing courts in Illinois are to
continue to defer to the trial court, justice re-
quires that even without a request from coun-
sel, when the trial court has notice of language
difficulty it should make some more formal
determination of the defendant's ability to
speak English before concluding that the stat-
ute is satisfied. Without such a formal determi-
whom spoke virtually no English, attempted to testify
that they had seen the defendant asleep in the living
room of his father's apartment at the time of the
assault. A review of the abstract of the record reveals
a long series of unresponsive or confused answers.
Q: Isn't it a fact, Mr. Ortiz, that your son wasn't
living at your house?
A: Yes.
Q: At that time?
A: He living in the house for that time, right.
Q: Mr. Ortiz, isn't it a fact he was living with May?
A: No.
Q: On that date?
A: No, he was not married.
Q: Do you remember the day he was arrested?
A: Oh, that time he got two children ...
Q: ... when Salvatore got arrested for this
charge, was he living at home?
A: Yes, with me yes ... with May then.
Abstract of Record 32. The judge however claimed
that he understood the testimony and concluded "he
brought four people up here to testified [sic] falsely.
All four of them contradicted each other." Record of
Proceedings at 120.
o 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973).
' Id. at 14-15. The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois has not routinized such
inquiries, although individual judges consider it wise.
Interview with U.S. District Court Judge Prentice
Marshall, (N.D. Ill.) (Nov. 15, 1976).
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nation, the Illinois statute, despite its obligatory
language, provides an inadequate and uncer-
tain shield for a defendant's constitutional
rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The Illinois courts have been slow to recog-
nize the constitutional questions inherent in
trial of the non-English-speaking defendant.
Even if he speaks some English, the constitu-
tional requirement of a fair trial, that he under-
stand the proceedings and be able to participate
in his own defense, may not be met. 2 The
courts seem to conclude that the trial court's
finding that under the interpreters law the de-
fendant speaks and understands enough Eng-
lish not to require an interpreter means that he
must have understood the proceedings against
him. The reviewing courts have therefore
shown deference to the trial courts even when a
constitutional claim is raised.'3 They have not
required that there be a greater showing from
the record when the question is whether the
waivers were understandingly given or whether
the defendant understood the testimony of ad-
verse witnesses.
In a series of cases the Supreme Court has
made clear that there must be a clear trial re-
cord to support a finding that constitutional
rights have been knowingly waived. As the
Court stated in Johnson v. Zerbst,54 "'[C]ourts
indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights
and... we 'do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights.'
55
The requirement for a record was well dem-
onstrated in Boykin v. Alabama, 6 in which the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on a
plea of guilty to armed robbery and remanded
for trial despite the overwhelming evidence
against the accused. The record was entirely
barren on the question of whether the guilty
52 See U.S. v. Dusky, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) discussing
mental incompetency: Due process requires that the
defendant have a "present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing-and ... a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him." Id. at 402.
5 See People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d 264, 300
N.E.2d 869 (1973); People v. Melero, 99 Ill. App. 2d
208, 240 N.E.2d 756 (1968); People v. Ayala, 8 I1.
App. 2d 393, 233 N.E.2d 80 (1967).
54 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
55 Id. at 464.
56 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
plea was understandingly and voluntarily
given. "So far as the record shows, the judge
asked no questions of petitioner concerning his
plea, and petitioner did not address the
court.
'57
Even a record of express waiver may be in-
sufficient and require further inquiry: "The
determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver ... must depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circum-
stances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience and conduct of the ac-
cused.""6
The Illinois Supreme Court fully discussed
the duty to assure that waiver of constitutional
rights are understandingly and expressly made
in People v. Fisher, 9 ajury waiver case. In People
v. Rambo,60 the Illinois appellate court recog-
nized that in some cases, even a clear record
that the defendant has been informed of his
right to a jury trial and has signed the jury
waiver form may require reversal. The court in
that case reversed the conviction of a sixteen-
year-old boy, stating that the youth of the boy
and seriousness of the crime imposed an extra
duty of care on the court to assure that the
waiver was made with full knowledge of the
consequences.61 The court would not rely on
the defense attorney's assent to the waiver of
the jury to satisfy the requirement of the Con-
stitution and its implementing statute62 for an
express, knowing waiver.
The Illinois courts have not provided the
same protection of the right by jury to the
linguistically infirm. Just as youth places special
obligations on the judge to assure that the plea
of guilty or jury waiver are understandingly
made, so, too, should language disability. Yet
in People v. Melero63 the reviewing court upheld
the bench trial conviction when the attorney
alone assented to the jury waiver and the trial
began:
The Court: Could he go to trial without an
interpreter?
Mr. Gilbert: He will try to do it. He speaks
Spanish.
57 Id. at 239.
58 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
59 340 I11. 250, 265, 172 N.E. 722, 728 (1930).
60 123 Il1. App. 2d 299, 260 N.E.2d 119 (1970).
61 Id. at 305, 260 N.E.2d at 122.
62 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-6 (1975).
61 99 Ill. App. 2d 208, 240 N.E.2d 756 (1968).
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The Court: Do you want me to hear the case or
do you want a jury trial?
Mr. Gilbert: Waive the jury, Your Honor.
The Court: State ready?
Mr. Hackett: The State is ready.64
Turning the Rambo decision on its head, the
Illinois appellate court considered this record
and concluded: "If the jury waiver here was not
understandingly made, this record does not
show it." 6 The defendant was presumed to
have assented to his attorney's waiver of a jury
trial by not objecting. Yet the error raised on
appeal was that the defendant was incompetent
to know or understand what right was being
waived. 66 Without a full exploration by the
court of the defendant's ability to comprehend
the proceedings, not merely to answer re-
hearsed questions in English, the conclusion
that the waiver was understandingly made was
improper.
Other appellate courts have refused to up-
hold the trial court in similar circumstances,
even when the record reveals that the defend-
ant speaks and understands some English.
The requirements of due process have been
used to narrow the scope of judicial discretion
as to appointment of an interpreter. In In re
Muraviov,67 the California Court of Appeals,
acting on a writ of habeas corpus, reversed and
6 4 1d. at 211, 240 N.E.2d at 757.
6 Id. An example of an Illinois trial judge more
conscientiously fulfilling his responsibility is illus-
trated by People v. Castillon, 132 Ill. App. 2d 581, 270
N.E.2d 268 (1970), in which Judge Collins rejected the
defense attorney's estimate of his client's ability to
understand English and the jury waiver:
THE COURT: I am sure you have done every-
thing in your power to properly defend this man,
however, I am not satisfied that we can proceed
to trial without an interpreter. I want someone to
tell this man in his own language what is transpir-
ing and we are beginning right at the beginning
with a waiver of a very basic constitutional right,
the waiver of jury trial, and I am not satisfied
that this record shows he understands that.
Id. at 583, 270 N.E.2d at 270.
66 The theory is that the defendant knows and
understands what his agent, that is, the attorney,
understands. But surely this theory of agency must
break down if the defendant and attorney cannot
communicate. Cf. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402 (1962), where in discussing mental incompetency,
the Court said due process requires an ability to
consult with one's lawyer. See also People v. Hernan-
dez, 8 N.Y.2d 345, 207 N.Y.S.2d 668, 170 N.E.2d 673,
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 976 (1960).
67 192 Cal. App. 2d 604, 13 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1961).
remanded a criminal conviction for wilful fail-
ure to support a minor child. The court found
that the defendant had not knowingly waived
his right to counsel. The trial court had asked
Muraviov four perfunctory questions, all of
which could be answered by "yes" or "no". The
responses had provided the basis for the Appel-
late Department of the Superior Court to find a
sufficient ability in English to sustain the trial
judge's action in proceeding without an inter-
preter. After conducting its own hearing on the
accused's ability to speak English, the appeals
court concluded:
lit should be obvious that if petitioner was un-
able to understand or speak English, his mono-
syllabic "yes" and "no" answers had no mean-
ing.
68
In a similar case, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Landeros v. State69 reviewed denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The court
examined the record of an illiterate Mexican-
American who had pleaded guilty to murder
after having his constitutional rights, including
his right to a jury trial, explained to him in
English. Although the defendant spoke and
understood some English, his use of English
was so limited that the court concluded he
could not have understandingly waived his con-
stitutional rights. Citing an earlier Oklahoma
case,"0 the court recommended appointment of
an interpreter when language ability is limited
as a "wholesome precautionary measure; and to
assure that all of the defendant's waivers were
knowingly and intelligently entered."'"
Both cases reached the reviewing court with
an addition to the bare record of the trial. In
Muraviov the habeas proceeding made clear to
the court that the defendant could not speak
English. In Landeros the record of the hearing
on the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty
provided similar evidence. These California
and Oklahoma cases suggest the constitutional
insufficiency of the Illinois courts' position. Illi-
nois courts should require a substantial record
demonstrating the defendant's ability to speak
and understand English before finding that a
waiver is knowing.
68 Id. at 606, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
69 480 P.2d 273 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
76 Parra v. Paige, 430 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. 1967).
71 480 P.2d at 275 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
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Right of Confrontation and Cross-examination of
Witnesses
The courts have long recognized that the
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses
"really means the right of the accused to hear
the witnesses testify against him and to cross-
examine them."72 In a 1970 case, United States ex
rel. Negron v. New York, 73 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the right to an
interpreter for the indigent non-English-speak-
ing defendant was a necessary adjunct to pro-
tection of the defendant's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him. The Second
Circuit affirmed a district court decision sus-
taining a petition for writ of habeas corpus for
an illiterate Puerto Rican migrant worker who
had been convicted of murder. Although an
interpreter was provided for the convenience
of the court when Negron and two other wit-
nesses testified and during a brief conference
with Negron's lawyer, twelve English-speaking
witnesses had testified without any translation
for Negron nor communication between Ne-
gron and his attorney. The court found that
Negron was linguistically incompetent to stand
trial without an interpreter to aid him. "To
Negron, most of the trial must have been a'
babble of voices."74 Because Negron was indi-
gent, the trial court was obliged to provide the
interpreter. 7' The Second Circuit concluded
that in no sense did Negron's silence constitute
a waiver of his fundamental right to confront
the witnesses against him through an inter-
preter, for his silence did not satisfy the consti-
tutional standard for waiver: "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.176 Nor would Negron's attorney be found
72 United States v. Barricota, 45 F. Supp. 38 *(S.D.
N.Y. 1942).
73 434 F.2d 386 (1970).
74 Id. at 388.
75 The Second Circuit had earlier suggested that
due process and the right to confront witnesses might
require appointment of an interpreter. In United
States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967), affd on
other grounds, 394 U.S. 244 (1968), a Frenchman,
charged with dealing in heroin, clearly had the re-
sources to pay for an interpreter but disassociated
himself from the interpreter when he learned he
must pay for the service. Negron satisfied the implied
requirement of indigency suggested in Desist. 434
F.2d at 389.
76 434 F.2d at 390, citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938).
to have waived Negron's right when the right
was previously so ill-defined.
77
The Second Circuit recognized the prece-
dential value of its decision for the defendant
who speaks no English. But the decision did
little for the defendant who, unlike Negron,
speaks some English. The court suggested the
parallel of the linguistically incompetent to the
mentally incompetent. 78 But it did not explicitly
hold, as the Supreme Court had held with re-
spect to mental incompetence in Pate v. Robin-
son,79 that when linguistic incompetence is a
possibility, the court should hold a hearing sua
sponte to determine competence. 0 Negron's lin-
guistic incompetence was "obvious, not just a
possibility."'" By neglecting to suggest proce-
dures for determining whether the defendant
had a "severe language difficulty,""2 the Second
Circuit left intact the practice by which a re-
viewing court would examine the record for
hints of the defendant's linguistic competence
as a basis for upholding the trial judge's discre-
tionary decision. It was because Negron came
to the court on a writ of habeas corpus that the
court looked beyond the record. Furthermore,
the right to court appointment of an inter-
preter remained limited to indigent defend-
ants. As the right to an interpreter is now
clearly established, the court may presume a
waiver of the right if the private attorney does
not claim it.
Some of the deficiencies of Negron were over-
come in United States v. Carrion 3 where the First
Circuit recognized that protection of a defend-
ant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and to
confront witnesses may require an interpreter,
even if the defendant has "some ability to un-
derstand and communicate" in English:
77 434 F.2d at 390. The court seemed to recognize
the danger that an attorney might not assert the right
and yet try to carry it on appeal. The obvious cure is
for the court on its own motion to hold a hearing on
the need.7
1 Id. citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
79 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
80 Of course, the Second Circuit decision was not
legally binding on any courts except those of the
Second Circuit. In People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d
264, 267, 300 N.E.2d 869, 871 (1973) the court ac-
knowledged that there might be such an obligation
but that it was satisfied by asking the illiterate co-
defendant to act as interpreter. See text accompany-
ing notes 103 to 106 infra.
81 434 F.2d at 390.
82 Id. at 391.
83 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973).
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The right to an interpreter rests most funda-
mentally . . . on the notion that no defendant
should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incom-
prehensible ritual which may terminate in pun-
ishment.
Yet how high must the language barrier rise
before a defendant has a right to an interpreter?
... Because the determination is likely to hinge
upon various factors . . . considerations of judi-
cial economy would dictate that the trial court,
coming into direct contact with the defendant,
be granted wide discretion in determining
whether an interpreter is necessary .... But
precisely because the trial court is entrusted with
discretion, it should make unmistakably clear to
the defendant who may have a language diffi-
culty that he has the right to a court-appointed
interpreter if the court determines one is
needed, and, whenever put on notice that there
may be some significant language difficulty, the
court should make such a determination of
need.84
The First Circuit suggested that the trial court
must weigh the defendant's ability in English
together with the complexity of the issues for
trial. "5 In the exercise of its discretion, the trial
court has an obligation to hold a formal hearing
or to follow other procedures8 6 to assure that
the interpreter will be appointed if needed at
any point during the trial.
The First Circuit did not suggest that the
court's duty to determine need was lessened if
the attorney did not ask for an interpreter or
the defendant was not indigent. The initiative
remained with the court. Even after counsel in
Carrion stated that no interpreter was neces-
sary, the trial court had continued to be aware
of its responsibility to ensure the defendant
understood the testimony.
As early as 1957, the Illinois Supreme Court
recognized that if the defendant cannot under-
stand the testimony of the witnesses against him
because of a language barrier, the defendant
has been deprived of his constitutional right to
confront adverse witnesses. In People v. Shok, "
the Illinois Supreme Court found an abuse of
84 Id. at 14-15.
85 Id. This court is unique in recognizing the strain
of following testimony in another language even if
one has some ability to speak it.86Id. at 15.
87 12 Ill. 2d 93, 145 N.E.2d 86 (1957). The fact that
the court might glean what the witness meant from
the witness's tone of voice and emotions could not
compensate for an extensive record revealing the
witness's difficulty in expressing herself.
discretion in failure to appoint an interpreter
for a prosecuting witness who spoke almost no
English. The cross-examination had been se-
verely limited by the witness's disability. The
record was replete with evidence of the need
for a competent interpreter.
8 8
In People v. Starling,89 it was again the prose-
cuting witness, and not the defendant who
spoke no English. The appointed interpreter's
translation was so inadequate that neither the
court, counsel nor the defendant could follow
the testimony. The interpreter was repeatedly
chastised for carrying on an independent collo-
quy with the defendant. And the abortive cross-
examination by defense counsel had to be re-
shaped to make any sense at all. In Starling, the
Illinois appellate court recognized for the first
time that:
[T]he due process rights of persons charged
with crimes cannot be short-cut by avoiding the
ritual of translating each question and answer as
required in section 2 of the Act relating to inter-
preters .9
The reviewing court again had an adequate
record from which it could conclude that there
had been an abuse of discretion."
88 One could also argue that when a prosecuting
witness is so hampered in his or her use of English
that there is no way to make the testimony precise,
definite and sure, and the testimony is critical to the
conviction, then, as a matter of law, the defendant
has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
89 21 Ill. App. 3d 217, 315 N.E.2d 163 (1974).
9 Id. at 222, 315 N.E.2d at 168.
91 In People v. Ortiz, 22 I1. App. 3d 788, 317
N.E.2d 763 (1974), the defendant argued that his alibi
witnesses needed an interpreter. Without one, their
answers were "unresponsive and/or contradictory
and therefore unconvincing to the court." He was
therefore deprived of his right to present his defense.
Brief for Appellant at 50-51. Here, despite the clear
record of confusion, the appellate court barely ac-
knowledged the argument since the trial court had
"understood" the testimony. The issue in testing a
witness's testimony should not be whether the wit-
ness's answers are decipherable, but whether the wit-
ness understood the question and gave responsive
answers. The trial court's lack of recognition of the
possibility of linguistic isolation during a long period
of residency in the United States is revealed by the
judge's impatience with the defendant's contention.
At the trial the judge commented: "he brought four
people up here to testified [sic] falsely. All four of
them contradicted each other." Record at 120. At the
post conviction hearing the judge said:
They are long term residents of this area. And it
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But the Illinois courts have not yet held that
there was an abuse of discretion in any case
where the defendant claimed that he had not
been afforded his right to confront witnesses
because he did not have an interpreter for his
own use or because the interpretation granted
was deficient. 9 2 The record does not provide
any support for his claim that he has not
"heard" the testimony, and the Illinois courts
appear loath to find an abuse of discretion ab-
sent a record of miscomprehension.
This is not to suggest the reviewing court
need conclude from every incongruous ques-
tion and answer or from a record containing
only monosyllabic responses that there was er-
ror in not providing an interpreter. But where
the record is inadequate to make any decision
on the issue, and the question does not come to
the reviewing court in a form where it can
determine the defendant's competency
through its own hearing, the case should be
remanded for an explicit finding.
93
Such a procedure would also prevent manip-
ulation of the record by the defendant who
claims he does not speak adequate English and
then does not testify in order to preserve his
language disability as grounds for later appeal
or a writ of habeas corpus. 94 In State v. Ague-
lara,95 the Missouri trial court in an ex parte
hearing weighed the testimony that the defend-
ant spoke Spanish at home and his own claims
that he "couldn't get" the questions addressed
to him and only knew a few English words
sufficient for his job, together with testimony
by a friend that she spoke no Spanish but had
no difficulty communicating with the defend-
ant. The court concluded that no interpreter
was necessary. In upholding the trial court, the
is like many times these people, once they didn't
get what they want, then they didn't understand
what happened.
Record at 191.
92 People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d 264, 300 N.E.2d
869 (1973); People v. Martinez, 7 I1. App. 3d 1075,
289 N.E.2d 76 (1972).
" Since the obligation rests on the court as well as
the defendant's counsel, the failure of the defend-
ant's counsel to request an interpreter should not be
taken as a waiver if there is an indication of need. But
see People v. Melero, 99 Ill. App. 2d 208, 240 N.E.2d
756 (1968).
" This was the obvious concern of the court in
People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d 264, 300 N.E.2d 869
(1973) and People v. Ayala, 89 Ill. App. 2d 393, 233
N.E. 2d 80 (1967).
"5 33 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1930).
Missouri Supreme Court stated that in each
instance where inability to understand the pro-
ceedings was claimed or apparent there must be
an express determination of whether an inter-
preter was necessary before the court will sup-
port the decision not to provide an interpreter
as a sound exercise of discretion.9'
Quality of Interpretation
The court in People v. Starling9e 7 recognized
that the quality of interpretation may deter-
mine whether the defendant has understood
the testimony against him sufficiently to satisfy
the constitutional requirement. Similarly, the
quality of interpretation may affect whether the
defendant has understood and knowingly
waived his rights.
The interpreter-for-the-deaf statute provides
more assurance that the defendant's constitu-
tional rights will be protected than does the
language-interpreter statute. The previous
deaf-mute statute explicitly required a "quali-
fied" interpreter;98 the amended statute re-
quires that the interpreter be a "qualified inter-
preter of the deaf sign language."9 The Illinois
appellate court in Hudson v. Augustine's, Inc."'
found that an interpreter who was not formally
trained to interpret for the deaf, but instead
only knew what the deaf mute had taught him,
did not satisfy the statutory requirement of
competency. The interpreter had only been
able to testify to what he understood the deaf
mute to have said, a translation which the court
did not find sufficiently "unequivocal and posi-
tive and definite in character."' 0'
The language interpreters statute says noth-
ing about qualifications. Policemen, state em-
ployees, and co-defendants are not disqualified
solely on the ground that they may be inter-
ested parties.1"' The court, in the exercise of its
96 Id. at 904.
97 21 Ill. App. 3d 217, 315 N.E.2d 163 (1974).
98 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.01 (1963) (current
version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.01 (1975)).
'9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.01 (1975).
"o 72 Ill. App. 2d 225, 218 N.E.2d 510 (1966).
1o Id. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 516.
102 Interview with Christina Ruiz, Cook County
criminal court interpreter (Dec. 5, 1975). See People v.
Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N.E. 609 (1916); People v.
Torres, 18 Ill. App. 3d 921, 310 N.E.2d 780 (1974)
(police officer); People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d 264,
300 N.E.2d 869 (1973) (co-defendant); People v. Del-
gado, 10 Ill. App. 3d 33, 294 N.E.2d 84 (1973) (un-
sworn bailiff).
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discretion, has used and continues to use rela-
tives and friends or to press court clerical per-
sonnel into service.'0 3 Only one case reviewed
revealed an inquiry by the court into the cre-
dentials of the interpreter; the burden is on the
defendant to show lack of qualification.'" In
only a few cases have the Illinois courts found
the interpreter incompetent; those involved
translation of witnesses' testimony, where the
confusion of court and counsel because of the
interpreter's incompetence was clear on the re-
cord .115
Any subsequent challenge to the competence
of the interpreter when the translation has been
made for the benefit of the defendant and not
the court suffers from the same disability as
that presented when no interpreter is provided.
There is no record of theforeign language interpreta-
tion. Yet behind the questions of competency of
the interpreter and the quality of the interpre-
tation lies the question of what the defendant
heard and agreed to.
In People v. Rivera, 0 6 the Illinois appellate
court found that appointment of a co-defend-
ant as interpreter at the suggestion of the public
defender satisfied the requirements of the stat-
ute. Any objection to the appointment had
been waived by counsel's tender of the inter-
103 People v. Rardin, 255 Ill. 9,99 N.E. 59 (1912). In
July, 1974, the author, attending a preliminary hear-
ing for a case handled by the Northwestern Univer-
sity Legal Assistance Clinic, was pressed into service
as interpreter for two other cases at the Cook County
Criminal Court Building. The same ad hoc proce-
dure was observed during visits to Cook County
Court, Municipal Division, Boy's, Gun, and Auto
Theft branches, Nov., 1975.
The N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, § 1, at 48, col. 3,
reports that at a pretrial hearing to determine
whether a prosecutor-obtained interpreter had
served as a prosecution informant, a member of the
audience was drafted to interpret the proceedings for
the Croatian defendant.
Judge Wayne W. Olson complains that without a
professional interpreter it is almost impossible to ob-
tain a translation which would make a record of the
defendant's comprehension of the proceedings, since
the interpreter is inclined to explain rather than
translate, when the defendant doesn't understand.
Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Cook County
Court, Branch 44 (Dec. 1, 1975).
'0' People v. Martinez, 7 Il1. App. 3d 1075, 289
N.E.2d 76 (1972).
'o' E.g., People v. Starling, 21111. App. 3d 217, 315
N.E.2d 163 (1974). In People v. Allen, 22 11. App. 3d
800, 317 N.E.2d 633 (1974), the interpreter, a friend
of the complaining witness, was found dis'qualified as
an interested party.
' 13 Il. App. 3d 264, 300 N.E.2d 869 (1973).
preter. The court looked at the careful instruc-
tions on jury waiver which the trial court had
given to the defendants followed by the ques-
tion, "He understand that?" and the defend-
ant's answer, "Yes." Despite the absence of any
record that the co-defendant had translated the
court's words, the reviewing court refused to
draw the negative inference that an inadequate
translation had taken place.'0 7 Nor did the
court find evidence of incompetence in the co-
defendant translator's confession to the court
that he did not know how to read, but would
"tell" the defendant what the jury waiver form
said. 08 This is similar to the Illinois court's
practice in accepting interpretations which are
not literal translations but merely substantially
the same as the testimony.'09 Finally, the court
did not question how the co-defendant could
provide adequate interpretation once the pre-
liminary proceedings were over and the trial of
both defendants was under way.
In People v. Martinez,'" there was no question
about the competency of the defense attorney
to speak and understand Spanish, but the ade-
quacy of the interpretation which he gave to the
defendant was at issue."' The defendant, a
107 [T]he record . . . does not show that any in-
terpretation in fact occurred. Defendant wishes
us to indulge in the negative inference that
therefore no interpretation did in fact occur; ...
Such a negative inference is too slender a reed
on which to predicate reversible error.
Id. at 268, 300 N.E.2d at 872.
10s Abstract of Record at 5
'01 People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N.E. 609
(1916). In Murphy the witness referred to the assail-
ants in Greek as "negalos" [the big man] and "mikros"
[the little man]; the interpreter substituted the names
of the defendants for those references. Id. at 320-21,
114 N.E. at 615.
The insufficiency of summary translations was
commented on by the court in United States ex rel.
Negron v. New York, 434 F. 2d 386 (1970):
However astute [the] summaries may have been,
they could not do service as a means by which
Negron could understand the precise nature of
the testimony against him during that period of
the trial's progress when the state chose to bring
it forth. Negron's incapacity to respond to spe-
cific testimony would inevitably hamper the ca-
pacity of his counsel to conduct effective cross-
examination .... [A]s a matter of simple hu-
maneness, Negron deserved more than to sit in
total incomprehension as the trial proceeded.
Id. at 389-90.
"o 7 11. App. 3d 1075, 289 N.E.2d 76 (1972).
' Although the fact that an attorney speaks the
language of the accused has led courts to hold that no
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Puerto Rican who neither spoke nor under-
stood English, pleaded guilty to murder and
two charges of attempted murder. On appeal
he argued that his attorney had tricked him at
the trial, taking the time allowed by the judge
for translation of thejudge's admonitions to tell
him that if he did not plead guilty he would get
100-199 years. The defendant claimed that he
believed he was pleading guilty to manslaugh-
ter. The court acknowledged that the record
carried no indication of the defendant's know-
ing waiver of his right to a jury trial, but pre-
sumed that the attorney, whose ability to trans-
late was established by the trial court, had
properly translated the admonitions. Again,
because of the absence of any record of the
Spanish spoken to the defendant, the record
necessary to determine the merits of the appeal
was unavailable to the reviewing court. No Eng-
lish-speaking defendant suffers this disability
when he asks the court to review the record for
evidence of an involuntary plea.
The first solution would be to provide for-
eign language transcriptions of the inter-
preter's translation of the proceedings. The
transcription could be checked against the Eng-
lish-language proceedings to determine
whether sufficient translation was provided so
that the defendant could understand the pro-
ceedings. One attorney has argued without suc-
cess that foreign language transcriptions are
required by chapter 37, section 163(F)(1) of the
Illinois Revised Statutes, which calls for full
stenographic notes of the proceedings.112 The
Illinois courts have, however, rejected the con-
tention that the proceedings must be immedi-
ately and fully translated to the defendant." 3
An inexpensive and uncomplicated method of
preserving the record would be to tape the in-
terpretation for later transcription if necessary,
should the competency of the translation be
interpreter is necessary, it should be clear that the
attorney cannot translate the substance of testimony
and properly carry out his functions. But see People v.
Martinez, id., 289 N.E.2d 76; cf. People v. Pelgri, 39
Ill. 2d 568, 237 N.E.2d 453 (1968).
"2 Brief for Appellant at 14, People v. Martinez, 7
I11. App. 3d 1075, 209 N.E.2d 76 (1972). The court
reporter at any arraignment must take full steno-
graphic notes of the proceedings, including the plea
by the accused, the receipt and entry by the court,
and the admonishment by the court. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 37, § 661 (1975).
1' People v. Torres, 18 I11. App. 3d 921, 926, 310
N.E.2d 780, 784 (1974), citing Tapia Corona v. United
States, 369 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966).
challenged. But there is no precedent in Illinois
for even this modest method of assuring that
the substance of the proceedings is communi-
cated.
It is no real solution to be able to determine
after the trial that the translation was insuffi-
cient. Despite the silence of the statute, the trial
court is obliged to make an express determina-
tion of need if it has notice of language diffi-
culty and to appoint competent interpreters.
Neither obligation is relieved by the defense
counsel's waiver of an interpreter, tender of an
incompetent one, or failure to object to the
quality of interpretation. The court should in-
dependently determine the competency of the
interpreter, unless a professional one is pro-
vided by the state. California is almost unique
in providing that judges may use examinations
or "other suitable means" to assure the compe-
tency of interpreters. 1 4 The Illinois Supreme
Court or Illinois legislature should implement
similar measures.
Employment of a Professional Interpreter
The right to an interpreter to aid the non-
English-speaking defendant in protection of his
constitutional rights has been more effectively
recognized in the federal courts and some other
states than in Illinois. The federal courts have
moved toward requiring regular procedures to
determine need or substantive evidence that
the trial judge has in fact made a determination
of need whenever language difficulty has de-
veloped during a trial. Despite the fact that no
standards for interpreters have been promul-
gated by the United States Supreme Court and
no Supreme Court rule makes appointment
obligatory, the various district courts of the
Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits and
of Puerto Rico now employ professional inter-
preters. Verbatim interpretation is therefore
available for the convenience of the court in
taking testimony and to translate the proceed-
ings for the indigent defendant.
In the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and in Puerto
11
4 See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 264 (West Supp.
1971). Kansas specifically disqualifies relatives of the
first or second degree and provides that before ap-
pointment, the appointing authority shall make:
a preliminary determination that the interpreter
is able to readily communicate with the person
whose primary language is one other than Eng-
lish ... and is able to accurately repeat and
translate the statement of said person.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4353(b) (Supp. 1975).
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Rico, the interpreters are always available with-
out regard to indigency.i 5 In the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois the right to an interpreter at government
expense is limited to the indigent defendant,
although some district courtjudges will arrange
for the interpreter and determine the source of
compensation later.i 's Non-English speaking
defendants who retain their own attorneys are
often inadequately protected ." 7 The federal in-
terpreter may be called to appear at the bond
hearing after the narcotics agent has informed
the United States Attorney that the accused
does not speak English, or the Federal De-
fender's office may call before arraignment.
But if the defendant subsequently secures a
private attorney, the federal interpreter may no
... MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 72; 1966 JuD.
CONF. REP. 59. All proceedings in U.S. District Court
in Puerto Rico are required to be in English, 48
U.S.C. § 864 (1974). Since only 37.7% of the adult
population speaks English, STATUS OF PUERTO Rico
152,supra note 17, the need for a full-time interpreter
is manifest.
116 Interview with U.S. District Court Judge Pren-
tice Marshall (N.D. Ill.) (Nov. 15, 1976).
1,7 Interview with U.S. District Court (N.D. Ill.)
interpreter Alicia Haas, Dec. 3, 1975. Because Mrs.
Haas is not salaried, the district court's position had
been that she could not be made available to the
defendant at government's expense without a show-
ing of indigency; however, the district court is consid-
ering a proposal to provide regular court appointed
interpreters. Interview with U.S. District Court
Judge Prentice Marshall, Nov. 15, 1976. Mrs. Haas
expressed dismay that the court had limited the right
to court appointed interpreters to indigents based on
the precedent of a case in which the defendant was a
rich French narcotics dealer. U.S. v. Desist, 384 F.2d
889 (2d Cir. 1967), affd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 244
(1968). The usual case, she said, is a basically poor
defendant who scrapes together money to pay the
private attorney in advance. The private attorney is
then often not interested in paying the $40-a-day rate.
More recently, the district court judges have increas-
ingly used Mrs. Haas' services without regard to de-
fendant indigency. Rule 28 Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure makes provision for appointment.
Mrs. Haas reports that when an interpreter is pres-
ent at the instigation of prosecutors rather than as an
employee of the court, defendants and their attor-
neys may distrust the interpreter. Interview with Mrs.
Haas, Nov. 10, 1976. The problem in using an inter-
preter obtained by prosecutors is illustrated in the
recent case of Croatian nationalists charged with hi-
jacking a jet. The prosecutions may be jeopardized
because the interpreter is charged with also serving as
a prosecution informant. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1975,
at 48, col. 3.
longer be employed for the defendant's use.
The defendant may then enlist a member of his
family or a friend who is not trained to translate
verbatim.
The Illinois decisions do not match those of
the federal courts in protecting the non-Eng-
lish-speaking defendant, but the practice which
is developing at the Cook County Criminal
Court Building may provide even greater ad-
vantages than does the federal system. Until
May, 1975, the branch courts located at the
Cook County Criminal Court Building de-
pended almost entirely on drafting ad hoc in-
terpreters, relatives, clerical and court person-
nel, when the need arose. A list of interpreters
was maintained for more drawn-out proce-
dures, but quality of translation of the proceed-
ings varied.""
The degree to which the need went unrecog-
nized is indicated by the startling increase in the
number of cases in which an interpreter has
been employed since the judges became aware
that the court had hired its first full-time salar-
ied interpreter, skilled in verbatim translation.
During the first month, the interpreter was
utilized in twenty-four courtroom proceedings.
The number of calls for courtroom work in-
creased steadily, so that in the fifth month she
made ninety-four courtroom appearances.'
While the Illinois language interpreters stat-
ute does not provide for an interpreter at the
early stages of the criminal process, the practice
at the Criminal Court Building exceeds the re-
quirements of the law. The interpreter arrives
at 8:30 A.M. and immediately consults with
interviewers to determine which prisoners
being held for bond hearings do not speak
English. Each morning there are five to eight
people in this category. "Before we even get
1"I Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2,
1975.
"9 Day book of Cook County Criminal Court inter-
preter, Christina Ruiz, May-Nov. 1975. Increasingly,
the judges at the Cook County Criminal Court Build-
ing take precautionary measures when there is some
doubt of the ability of the defendant to comprehend.
One judge who formerly had been quick to conclude
no interpreter was necessary now accounts for a sub-
stantial portion of the interpreter's caseload. Inter-
view with Christina Ruiz, Dec. 2, 1975. Anotherjudge
stated that there was no doubt that the court, know-
ing that the interpreter is available, can now explore
more carefully with the defendant his understanding
of the pleading, waivers, and testimony. Interview
with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2, 1975.
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started in the morning [the interpreter] has
spotted the cases where she will be needed ,
'"120
one judge told an interviewer. The interpreter,
appearing at the bond hearings, is able to have
her schedule considered when later proceed-
ings are being scheduled. When there are de-
lays or continuances, the defendant does not
find himself without an interpreter. If the need
is not immediately apparent but becomes clear
during the trial, the interpreter can be present
after only a brief recess.'
2 '
Once the need for an interpreter is estab-
lished, interpreter's services are provided at
state expense. The availability of a professional
interpreter means that the judges at the Cook
County Criminal Court Building can recom-
mend her services even when the defendant
retains a private attorney. Although private
counsel do not yet take proper advantage of the
availability of a free interpreter, some judges
regularly offer conference time for the private
attorney to consult with his client through the
interpreter.
22
In the past there have been almost no stan-
dards for interpretation of courtroom proceed-
ings to the non-English-speaking defendant
unless and until he testifies. Even then the stan-
dards have varied widely. But with the intro-
duction of a professional interpreter translating
verbatim, the quality of the defendant's under-
standing becomes a part of the record. When
there is confusion, when the defendant has not
understood the court's admonitions, there is no
longer a colloquy of explanation in the foreign
language between the defendant and the inter-
preter. The defendant's questions are trans-
lated to the court and the court's further ex-
120 Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2,
1975.
121 Personal observations of the author during a
half day spent with Criminal Court interpreter,
Christina Ruiz, Cook County Criminal Court, Dec. 2,
1975. In the first year of the program, the single
interpreter was also on call to all branch courts, but
she could not meet these demands and also meet the
mass need at the central criminal court. A second
interpreter now serves the southern branch courts.
Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Nov. 12,
1976.
122 Public defenders also have a greater opportu-
nity to prepare their cases involving non-English-
speaking defendants. Common practice in interviews
had been to use other Spanish-speaking prisoners.
Conversation with Public Defender Thomas Moore,
Cook County Criminal Court, Dec. 2, 1975.
planation provided to the defendant through
the interpreter.'"
Furthermore, when English-speaking wit-
nesses, counsel or the court speak, the court
can be confident that the proceedings are being
translated. The interpreter has the powers of
intense concentration necessary for interpreta-
tion and no other duties to distract from that
obligation. A professional interpreter also can
master the subtleties of dialect 12 4 and the spe-
cialized language of such fields as medical path-
ology. Moreover, the interpretation is not ob-
trusive.
For the defendant whose bond hearing is
held elsewhere in Cook County or whose al-
leged criminal act carries him into some other
courtroom in the state, the need for interpreta-
tion of the proceedings to the defendant con-
tinues to be ignored or inadequately met except
when provided by conscientious counsel. Even
at the Cook County Criminal Court Building,
needs in languages other than Spanish are met
in a more makeshift manner. And some judges
still prefer to avoid using an interpreter's ser-
vices unless the need is glaring. 2 Thus, protec-
tion of the defendant's rights is still somewhat
arbitrary.
CONCLUSION
While recognizing that failure to provide an
interpreter might violate a defendant's consti-
tutional rights to a jury trial or confrontation of
witnesses, the Illinois appellate court contin-
ues to give such deference to the trial court's
discretion in cases where the defendant speaks
little English that appeal is discouraging. The
court's failure to insist on an adequate record of
the defendant's comprehension of the proceed-
ings to support the trial court's decision not to
' See People v. Starling, 21 111. App. 3d 217, 221
N.E.2d 163 (1974).Judge Olson reported that this was
one of the most recurring and frustrating problems
in that he could not know if the explanation con-
tained the substance of the court's words. Interview
with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2, 1975.
'24 In People v. Starling, 21 Ill. App. 3d 217, 221
N.E.2d 163 the question whether the Spanish-speak-
ing witness had been in a bar was misunderstood
when the bailiff-interpreter apparently translated the
word as "bara," a Caribbean usage. The witness de-
nied being in the "bara." In Mexico the word is
"cantina." Brief for Appellant at 15.
' Interview with Criminal Court interpreter Chri-




provide an interpreter means that appointment
of any interpreter is often a matter of chance.
Furthermore, even in those cases where an in-
terpreter is used, since no provision is made for
appointment of professional interpreters or for
transcribing or recording the interpretation
given, the trial record often reveals almost
nothing of what an interpreter has in fact com-
municated to the defendant or whether the
defendant has understood.
A hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea, if appropriate and timely, or a petition on
a writ of habeas corpus may be the only ways
that such a defendant can create an independ-
ent record of his disability. It may even be more
difficult to establish the incompetence of an
interpreter who has translated nothing for the
record.' 26 Until the Supreme Court of Illinois
or the Illinois legislature establishes clear pro-
cedures and standards to determine need and
quality of interpretation, the non-English-
speaking defendant's rights to trial by jury, to
effective counsel, to confront adverse witnesses
and to a fundamentally fair trial are not as-
sured.
126 E.g., People v. Rivera, 13 Il1. App. 3d 264, 300
N.E. 2d 869 (1972).
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